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Category management (CM) is challenging for retailers that sell thousands of products across hundreds of
categories and often lack the resources and capabilities to manage all of them intensively. Some retailers respond
by picking one supplier to be a “category captain” that manages the category—including rivals’ brands—on their
behalf. Others worry that influential captains will be opportunistic and that the benefits of intensive CM are simply
not worth the costs. However, there is little conceptual development or empirical evidence concerning CM best
practices. The authors develop a comprehensive model of retail CM based on a synthesis of field interviews and
relevant literature, especially work on governance value analysis theory. Their test of the model using category and
financial growth data from U.S. supermarket chains shows that more intensive CM improves results. Furthermore,
use of a category captain increases CM effort and results, without increasing opportunism or problems with other
suppliers. The authors also find that retailers with more resources are less likely to rely on help from a category
captain; yet the level of retailer resources is not related to CM intensity. Thus, “go-it-alone” retailers do not deploy
their own resources on CM and miss out on the corresponding performance improvements.
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I
n increasingly competitive markets, managers and schol-
ars must rethink traditional approaches to creating and
capturing value, including how interorganization relation-
ships are handled (e.g., Cannon and Perreault 1999; Frazier
et al. 2009; Palmatier, Dant, and Grewal 2007; Wathne and
Heide 2004). Nowhere is this more evident than in the
channel for consumer packaged goods (CPGs), in which
category management (CM) is a key issue for both suppli-
ers and retailers (e.g., Gajanan, Basuroy, and Beldona 2007;
Lindbloom and Olkkonen 2006). Category management
involves the allocation of resources within sets of comple-
mentary and/or competing brands to maximize planned out-
comes (e.g., Basuroy, Mantrala, and Walters 2001; Morgan,
Kaleka, and Gooner 2007) and involves the analysis of
category-level data, setting goals for category performance,
and the formulation and execution of plans to maximize
category-level results (e.g., Desrochers, Gundlach, and Foer
2003; Dupre and Gruen 2004).While CM is common
among CPG manufacturers, retailers typically sell thou-
sands of products across hundreds of categories, and as a
result, most lack the resources to intensively manage all the
categories they sell. Some experts urge retailers to address
their CM challenge and ramp up the intensity of their CM
efforts by leveraging the resources and capabilities of a lead
supplier—or even to designate a “category captain” sup-
plier to manage the category (including rivals’ brands) for
them (e.g., Aastrup, Grant, and Bjerre 2007; Gruen and
Shah 2000). However, this idea is controversial. There are
anecdotal reports of successes, but many retailers fear that
this idea carries significant risks, including opportunistic
behaviors by lead suppliers such as manipulating data
analyses to lead to CM decisions that favor their own
brands at the expense of the retailer and other suppliers.
Furthermore, in most categories, retailers work with multi-
ple suppliers to provide required levels of consumer choice.
Many retailers fear that giving one supplier an influential
role in their CM will prompt damaging push-back from
other suppliers, such as reducing trade allowances or delay-
ing access to new products. Some retailers are also cautious
because of public policy concerns that reliance on a cate-
gory captain may inhibit competition and lower consumer
welfare (e.g., Desrochers, Gundlach, and Foer 2003; Steiner
2001).
Therefore, retail CM is an important but problematic
area for retailers and their suppliers, and it is challenging
from both theoretical and public policy perspectives.
Despite this, there is little empirical evidence on retail CM
(Dhar, Hoch, and Kumar 2001; Gruen and Shah 2000).
Most prior CM research has drawn on analytical models of
channel behavior, and the limited empirical work has
focused only on specific CM elements such as opportunistic
supplier behaviors (Morgan, Kaleka, and Gooner 2007) or
the appropriation of any incremental CM rents (Basuroy,
Mantrala, and Walters 2001). Therefore, managers have no
comprehensive evidence-based guidance regarding whether
more intensive retail CM pays off and little insight into the
costs and benefits of using a lead supplier to help their retail
CM efforts. This is unfortunate, because many retailers
report having failed to make their CM efforts and associated
supplier relationships work (e.g., Howe 2006; Kumar
2005), and many retailers remain skeptical and even fearful
of CM.
Integrating field interviews and the literature, we develop
a comprehensive new conceptual model of retail CM and its
key antecedents and outcomes. We test this model using
data on 35 product categories from a representative sample
of U.S. supermarket chains. We complement this model test
by contrasting the results achieved when retailers choose to
rely (or not) on a category captain. In combination, our
results show that retailer skepticism about CM’s benefits—
and fears about relying on a category captain—are both
unfounded. We show that more intensive CM improves
financial results and that retailers that allow a lead supplier
more influence benefit from more intensive CM. We also
show that even when retailers possess the required CM
resources, they frequently undermanage categories and, as a
result, underperform. Contrary to retailer fears, we find that,
on average, a category captain is no more likely act oppor-
tunistically and actually provokes less—not more—damag-
ing push-back response from other suppliers. Our results
provide important new insights into retail CM and illumi-
nate several theoretically important but underresearched
aspects of buyer–supplier relationships.
We begin with a brief discussion of how our conceptual
model was developed. Then, we present our model of retail
CM, its antecedents, and outcomes, along with formal
hypotheses of relationships between constructs we identify
as key to understanding retail CM. We then describe our
data collection and tests of the hypothesized relationships.
We report the results and their implications for theory,
managerial practice, and public policy. We conclude with a
discussion of the limitations of our study and directions for
further research.
Conceptualization and Hypotheses
Theories advanced in marketing and management suggest
myriad factors that could be relevant to understanding retail
CM activities, the role or impact of suppliers in retail CM,
and likely antecedents and consequences of different CM
approaches (e.g., Morgan, Kaleka, and Gooner 2007). How-
ever, no comprehensive framework for understanding CM
exists. To develop a conceptualization reflecting the spe-
cific context of retail CM and narrow the focus to only the
key factors required for a comprehensive model, we first
conducted qualitative fieldwork.
After synthesizing academic and trade literature rele-
vant to CM, we developed a semistructured telephone inter-
view protocol based on discussions with a convenience
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sample of top managers involved in retail CM from four
retailers and three CPG suppliers. We included open-ended
questions about different CM activities for supermarket
retailers, the extent to which suppliers were involved in
retail CM decisions and their execution, and the different
costs and benefits of retail CM efforts. We then used a
snowball sampling approach to identify 49 managers (21
retail buyers and CMs, 11 CM consultants, 10 supplier
managers, and 7 top retail executives) with whom we con-
ducted in-depth telephone interviews. The interviewees rep-
resented a wide range of retailers (ranging from those with
as few as 3 stores to national chains with more than 400
stores); leading suppliers of food, beverage, perishable, and
nonfood products; and consultants working for major con-
sulting firms engaged in CM. We also interviewed leaders
of major trade associations and editors and analysts from
the trade press. These interviews helped us identify factors
key to understanding retail CM and its antecedents and out-
comes and to elicit managers’ beliefs concerning cause and
effect relationships among these factors.
Multiple theories were potentially relevant to exploring
different aspects of the conceptualization of retail CM that
emerged in our fieldwork. However, recent governance
value analysis (GVA) extensions of transaction cost analy-
sis (TCA) (e.g., Ghosh and John 2005, 2009) have created a
new theoretical lens that we viewed as being the single
theory that most closely aligned with our original fieldwork-
based CM conceptual model. Therefore, we use GVA as a
theoretical lens for exploring the relationships suggested in
our model. In essence, GVA combines the cost minimiza-
tion calculus of TCA with the resource-based view insight
that firm-specific resources drive realized strategy posi-
tions. Consistent with GVA, we contend that retail CM is a
governance mechanism that enables retailers and suppliers
to organize and align their resources and transactions to
promote and leverage cooperation in ways that create and
claim value (cf. Ghosh and John 1999). While no single
study—especially the first one in a new research area—can
offer a comprehensive test of GVA theory, we show that
ideas that are distinctive to GVA theory help support and
inform hypotheses about relationships among the constructs
identified by our fieldwork as most important to under-
standing retail CM.
Our fieldwork-based conceptualization suggests that in
retail CM, retailers and their suppliers (1) have different
resource profiles, (2) use these different resources to create
and claim value with CM, and (3) are self-interested insofar
as they seek to organize and align themselves in ways that
both are efficient and deliver them the greatest total value.
Therefore, the central problem in retail CM is how to effi-
ciently and effectively coordinate the category-level actions
of these different parties when competition among retailers
and between suppliers combines with dynamic consumer
demand to require continuous adaptation. Creating value
through retail CM requires close retailer–supplier coopera-
tion, but the different resource profiles and self-interests
between the parties involved also creates tensions in how
any value created is claimed and by whom.
In the following section, we synthesize our qualitative
insights with those available from the GVA and other rele-
vant literature to develop the model summarized in Figure
1. Our model focuses on when and how the use of a CM
governance mechanism (lead supplier influence) generates
resources for retail CM (the intensity with which CM activi-
ties are performed in a category) and the resulting benefits
(both retailer and lead supplier category performance out-
comes) and problems created (lead supplier opportunism
and militant push-back behaviors by other suppliers). We
first describe our conceptualization of retail CM, and then
we discuss formal hypotheses of the relationships repre-
sented in Figure 1. Four of the relationships between the
constructs in Figure 1 have been examined in a related
study of supplier opportunism in the U.K. supermarket sup-
ply chain (Morgan, Kaleka, and Gooner 2007). Therefore,
we do not develop formal hypotheses for these four rela-
tionships here; however, we include them in our model and
briefly compare the path coefficients from the two different
studies in our discussion of results. 
Retail CM
Two key aspects of retail CM are at the heart of our model
(Figure 1). First is CM intensity, or the time and effort
devoted to retail CM activities, regardless of whether they
are performed by the retailer or with the help of one or
more suppliers. This may range from devoting considerable
resources to detailed category-level analyses, planning, and
execution designed to maximize category performance to a
simple “straight rebuy” or “resupply” situation. Second,
lead supplier influence involves the role of the supplier that
has the most influence on the retailer’s CM. This may range
from a retailer-designated category captain that manages
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the category on the retailer’s behalf to a supplier that has lit-
tle more influence than any other on a retailer’s CM deci-
sions and actions. Thus, our conceptualization of retail CM
comprises two continua—CM intensity and lead supplier
influence—encompassing situations in which little or no
retail CM activities are performed and the retailer simply
relies on “market” competition among suppliers to get
whatever help and support is available from each supplier,
as well as situations in which a retail category is intensively
managed, sometimes by leveraging the resources of an
influential lead supplier. Next, we elaborate on these two
central retail CM constructs.
Category management intensity is the extent to which
CM activities (i.e., category-level goal setting, analysis,
planning, and execution) are performed in a specific prod-
uct category. From a GVA perspective, CM intensity
involves resource deployments designed to create valuable
strategic positions among consumers by coordinating the
efforts of the retailer and all the suppliers to the category.
Such retailer–supplier coordination in CM includes analyz-
ing assortments of manufacturers’ and store-brand stock-
keeping units (SKUs) to maximize category-level profits;
planning and executing supporting shelf-sets, promotional
schedules, feature advertising, endcap allocations, cross-
merchandizing, and so on; and logistical activities, includ-
ing inbound-delivery timing and quantity/product mix
required for retailer warehouse and direct-to-store deliver-
ies, supplier in-store product-handling, reverse logistics,
and so on. Because consumers’ needs and rivals’ strategies
are constantly shifting, effective retail CM requires frequent
adaptation.
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However, even large supermarket chains generally lack
the resources to intensively manage all the categories they
sell, though competitive pressures make it risky not to
intensively manage a product category. Therefore, retailers
face difficult decisions involving how much time, effort,
and other resources they will allocate to CM in each of the
categories they sell and how to deal with CM resource
shortfalls.
The second key aspect of retail CM is lead supplier
influence. The lead supplier is the supplier to the category
that has the most influence (relative to other suppliers) over
the retailer’s CM decisions and actions (Morgan, Kaleka,
and Gooner 2007). From a GVA perspective, lead supplier
influence is a form of plural governance. It is hierarchical in
terms of decision control and rights over the development
and execution of the retailer’s category-level strategies
(e.g., Grossman and Hart 1986; Heide and John 1992). At
the same time, lead supplier influence is also a relational
governance form in that it allows the lead supplier and
retailer to cooperate without formal agreements or con-
tracts, which are deliberately avoided because of antitrust
concerns. A retailer that faces resource deficits and wants to
leverage a lead supplier’s resources and capabilities to cre-
ate and capture greater value through CM may allow that
supplier to wield a great deal of influence. This extends to
the supplier operating as a category captain that effectively
manages the category and its suppliers on the retailer’s
behalf. At the other end of the continuum, a retailer may not
cede extra influence or control over CM to any supplier, in
which case the lead supplier has only slightly more influ-
ence than any other and may even simply be “first among
equals.” This occurs, for example, when retailers see down-
stream costs and risks that would lower their ability to
claim any joint value created by relying on one highly influ-
ential supplier.
Interviewees emphasized that even when a lead supplier
has a great deal of influence (or is even designated as a
category captain), the retailer usually also works with and
carries products from other suppliers in the category to give
consumers the choices they want. As a result, a highly influ-
ential lead supplier directly affects the marketing of its own
brands, the brands of rival category suppliers, and even the
retailer’s private label products. Thus, a retailer’s decision
to use a lead supplier in its CM efforts also affects its rela-
tionships with competing suppliers in the category, most of
which maintain an ongoing relationship with the retailer. 
Antecedents of Retail CM
Our fieldwork highlights three key resources required for
effective retail CM: knowledge of category consumers and
their buying behavior, financial resources for making and
executing CM decisions, and brand awareness among con-
sumers in the category. Interviews suggest that relative to
suppliers, retailers typically face resource deficits in these
key CM resources because suppliers specialize in fewer
categories and, in general, earn higher margins. The trade
literature suggests that a retailer can increase its available
CM resources by leveraging its relationship with a lead sup-
plier (e.g., Kumar 2005). However, our interviews revealed
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significant retailer fears of losing direct control over their
CM activities. Governance value analysis theory posits that
such fears may be well founded because leveraging a sup-
plier’s resources can create a value-claiming benefit for the
supplier (e.g., Ghosh and John 2009). Thus, retailers must
trade off the potential costs of decreased CM value-claiming
rights against the potential CM value-creating benefits of
having access to superior CM resources. Our fieldwork sug-
gests that retailers are only willing to cede influence in their
CM to a supplier in return for access to CM resources that
are clearly superior to those available in-house. Therefore,
we posit the following:
H1: The greater the retailer’s CM resources relative to those of
the lead supplier to the category, (a) the greater is the CM
intensity, and (b) the lower is the level of lead supplier
influence on retailer CM.
The literature distinguishes between resources such as
those identified previously and capabilities—the processes
by which such resources are combined and deployed to
achieve positional advantage among consumers (e.g.,
Vorhies and Morgan 2005). Capabilities can affect not only
a firm’s ability to engage in particular tasks but also its
“make or buy” decision of who should perform those tasks
(e.g., Argyres 1996). From this perspective, our interviews
highlighted the role of the retailer’s marketing capabilities
in its CM decision making. Whether necessary retail CM
resources are available in-house or are accessed through
relationships with an influential lead supplier, retailer inter-
views indicate that strong marketing capabilities are
required to effectively engage in retail CM. Consistent with
the GVA logic outlined previously for CM resources, pos-
session of strong marketing capabilities should mean that
retailers are both more able to effectively engage in inten-
sively managing a product category and less likely to have
to seek such capabilities from a lead supplier. This suggests
the following:
H2: The greater the retailer’s marketing capabilities, (a) the
greater is the CM intensity and (b) the lower is the level of
lead supplier influence on retailer CM.
The literature advocates that retailers allocate their
scarce CM resources to large, profitable, or traffic-building
product-categories that are most important to achieving
their overall objectives (e.g., Blattberg and Fox 1995). A
retailer that does not have needed resources and capabilities
in-house can either seek CM help from one or more suppli-
ers or simply pay less attention to the category. According
to GVA, retailers are more likely to leverage supplier
resources in strategically important categories because
these are where the most joint value can be created, which
may best offset any increased supplier value-claiming costs
(Ghosh and John 1999). However, suppliers face their own
resource allocation decisions (Gruen and Shah 2000). Our
interviews indicate that in line with GVA, suppliers prioritize
retail CM opportunities that both enhance their influence
with the retailer and provide advantage over rival suppliers.
Suppliers evaluate not only category characteristics (e.g.,
dollar sales) but also other drivers of a category’s impor-
tance to the retailer (e.g., traffic-building) in determining
the extent to which they are willing to invest in supporting a
retailer’s CM efforts. Therefore, we posit the following:
H3: The more strategically important the product category to
the retailer, the greater is the (a) CM intensity and (b) lead
supplier influence on retail CM.
Lead Supplier Influence and CM Intensity
As outlined previously, retailers often suffer deficits in
resources and capabilities needed for effective CM and are
commonly advised to seek help from an influential lead
supplier to bolster their CM efforts (e.g., Blattberg and Fox
1995). From a GVA perspective, this suggests that a
retailer’s need for the resources required to create value
through CM can be such that the retailer will cede signifi-
cant influence over CM decisions to a lead supplier in
return for the resources. This is consistent with the GVA lit-
erature in suggesting that given that the central adaptation
requirements of retail CM are noncontractible, the CM
“decision rights” should be secured by the party that can
produce the greatest systemwide adaptation value (e.g.,
Ghosh and John 2009; Grossman and Hart 1986). Our inter-
views suggest that when this occurs, the lead supplier is
more willing to deploy its own resources to help execute the
retail CM plans it helps shape. Thus, allowing a lead sup-
plier greater influence can lead to an enlarged pool of CM
resources and capabilities for the retailer (e.g., Corsten and
Kumar 2005). Therefore, we posit the following: 
H4: The greater the lead supplier’s influence on the retailer’s
CM, the greater is the CM intensity.
Consequences of Retailer CM
Trade analysts argue that retail CM offers category-level
benefits for both the retailer and suppliers, with claims of
sales increases of up to 11% and cost reductions of as much
as 2% of sales (e.g., Cannondale Associates 1999; Freed-
man, Reyner, and Tochtermann 1997). From a GVA per-
spective, such potential benefits represent the realized adap-
tation value of retailer–supplier coordination that results
from the new information and insight created by analyzing
current and potential performance at the retail category
level. Effective retail CM creates synergies by coordinating
the marketing efforts of individual SKUs, brands, and sup-
pliers, which can result in both enhanced systemwide deci-
sion making and lower costs (e.g., Blattberg and Fox 1995;
Desrochers, Gundlach, and Foer 2003). From a value-
claiming perspective, our fieldwork suggests that the value
created by retail CM is not fully appropriated by either the
retailer or any single supplier—not least because of sensi-
tivity to antitrust concerns.
Nonetheless, our interviews suggest that retailers usu-
ally claim the majority of the value that CM creates. This is
because from a “what gets measured gets done” perspec-
tive, analyzing category-level data to set goals and track
performance in retail CM provides the retailer with a con-
trol mechanism needed to both improve and monitor cate-
gory sales and cost performance (e.g., Anthony 1988;
Simons 1995). Thus, our fieldwork indicates that CM is a
mechanism whereby the retailer can have sufficient category-
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level control to ensure that it claims a significant amount of
the value created by coordinating its efforts with those of its
suppliers.
Our interviews indicate that suppliers may also benefit
from more intensive retail CM. For example, when more
intensive CM efforts increase category-level sales, it was
suggested that lead supplier sales usually increase at least
proportionately to their category share. Furthermore, if
SKUs of low-performing brands are dropped—as is often
the case when a category is more intensively managed—
lead suppliers, which often market leading brands, usually
benefit. From a GVA perspective, this suggests that while
retail CM creates significant value, it does not allow all of
this value to be claimed by the retailer—even if the retailer
has the necessary resources to make and execute appropri-
ate CM decisions without the help of a supplier. However,
more intensive CM does give retailers greater category-
level overview and insight, which enhances the retailer’s
ability to monitor its suppliers. Our interviews suggest that
such enhanced scrutiny provides a disincentive for lead
suppliers to engage in opportunistic behaviors.
The ability to claim value created by retail CM efforts
may also extend to other suppliers. Our interviews suggest
that better coordination through CM can increase the effi-
ciency of all suppliers’ marketing efforts and is therefore
welcomed even by suppliers that are not the lead supplier to
the category. This is consistent with prior evidence that
when specific investments are modest (as for nonlead sup-
pliers), buyer–supplier coordination can improve channel
efficiency (e.g., Buvik and John 2000). As a result of retail
CM not allowing the retailer and lead supplier to claim all
its value-creation benefits, managers indicated that retailers
could expect fewer push-back and acting-out-type militant
behaviors from other suppliers in implementing their CM
plans. Such militant behaviors are consistent with a more
active and negative framing of TCA conceptualizations of
acquiescence (i.e., militant behaviors are those that deliber-
ately impede effective and efficient supply chain manage-
ment) among less influential suppliers in a supply chain
(e.g., Williamson 1991). This leads us to posit the following:
H5: The greater the CM intensity, the better are the category
performance outcomes for both (a) the retailer and (b) the
lead supplier, and the lower are the levels of (c) lead sup-
plier opportunism and (d) militancy by other suppliers.
In addition to the hypothesized indirect benefits to the
retailer and all category suppliers from leveraging lead sup-
plier resources through enhanced retail CM intensity, our
interviews also suggest additional direct retailer and lead
supplier benefits. From a retailer perspective, although CM
intensity involves the extent to which CM activities are
undertaken for a product category, retailer interviews indi-
cate that the quality of CM activities are also often
enhanced when they leverage the resources and capabilities
of a lead supplier. Retail managers believe the CM planning
and implementation skills available from a carefully
selected lead supplier deliver category-level performance
benefits beyond those accruing from greater CM intensity
alone. For lead suppliers, our interviews indicate that a lead
supplier that is influential in the retailer’s CM often gains
preferential shelf-facings, larger assortments, promotional
display space, and other advantages that increase its cate-
gory share. This is consistent with evidence in other chan-
nel settings of a relationship between supplier decision-
making participation and support and a buyer’s resource
allocations (e.g., Anderson, Lodish, and Weitz 1987). In
GVA terms, a direct relationship between a lead supplier’s
CM influence and its category performance suggests that
influence on retail CM provides the lead supplier with a
value-claiming benefit that is not available to other suppli-
ers. Indeed, our interviews indicate that this goal motivates
lead suppliers to share their CM resources and expertise
with the retailer.
However, there may also be downside costs associated
with lead supplier influence on retail CM. For example,
Morgan, Kaleka, and Gooner (2007) find a positive rela-
tionship between a lead supplier’s influence and its oppor-
tunism in a study of the U.K. supermarket supply chain.
Therefore, we include this path in our model (R1). Our
interviews suggest that another likely cost of lead supplier
influence is its effect on other suppliers. A high level of CM
influence by one supplier is unlikely to be welcomed by its
rivals—as one manager commented, “No one—including
us— responds happily to a competitor making decisions for
their brand.” Transaction cost analysis theory posits that a
key outcome of one supplier having greater power in a
firm’s supply chain is less cooperation among the other sup-
pliers (e.g., Rindfleisch and Heide 1997; Williamson 1991).
Interviews reveal that retailers fear that using a lead sup-
plier in CM may provoke even more active forms of mili-
tant behaviors by other suppliers. Such responses may be
expected if a lead supplier is perceived by other suppliers to
use its CM influence to gain, for example, unwarranted
preferential shelf placements for its own brands or the most
beneficial promotional slots. Some retailers indicated that
they avoid relying on a lead supplier in their CM precisely
because they fear retaliation from other suppliers that may
withhold promotional support, market information, or other
resources required to effectively manage the category. Thus,
we posit the following:
H6: The greater the influence of the lead supplier on the
retailer’s CM, the better are the category performance out-
comes for both (a) the retailer and (b) the lead supplier, and
(c) the greater the level of militancy by other suppliers.
Consequences of Lead Supplier Opportunism and
Militancy by Other Suppliers
The literature and our interviews suggest that both lead sup-
plier opportunism and militancy by other suppliers toward
the category give rise to costs that can create significant
channel inefficiencies (e.g., Rindfleisch and Heide 1997;
Williamson 1993). For example, Morgan, Kaleka, and
Gooner (2007) report that lead supplier opportunism has a
direct negative effect on the performance of U.K. grocers.
They also posit an indirect effect through increased mili-
tancy by other suppliers but find that this militancy has an
insignificant effect on retailer performance. We include
paths for these relationships in our model (R2 and R3/R4,
respectively). However, our interviews also suggest costs to
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the lead supplier. For example, retailers interviewed believe
that they can usually detect and punish opportunistic behav-
ior by lead suppliers. There are obvious negative supplier
performance implications when a retailer punishes an
opportunistic lead supplier by terminating its influential
role in the retailer’s CM. Thus, we posit the following:
H7: The greater the level of lead supplier opportunism, the
lower is the category performance of the lead supplier.
Relationship Between Lead Supplier Outcomes
and Retailer Outcomes
Finally, our interviews reveal that from a value-claiming
perspective, retailer–lead supplier CM relationships are
informal and do not rely on formal governance agreements
and controls. Governance value analysis indicates that such
relational approaches can be appropriate when facing adap-
tation and coordination needs such as those associated with
retail CM (Ghosh and John 1999). The literature suggests
that when retailer–lead supplier CM relationships are
formed to maximize mutually beneficial outcomes,
improved lead supplier outcomes should also lead to
improved outcomes for the retailer (e.g., Bergen, Dutta, and
Walker 1992; Macneil 1980). Furthermore, our interviews
suggest that suppliers are increasingly competing with one
another to win the position of influence on retailer CM.
Suppliers recognize that they enjoy this position at the
retailer’s pleasure and that both retailer and supplier CM
outcomes can be observed by the retailer. A lead supplier
cannot simply improve its own performance at the expense
of the retailer. Rather, consistent with the channel influence
literature (e.g., Anand and Stern 1985), most suppliers
believe that retailers simply choose to work on retail CM
with the supplier that they expect to deliver them the best
economic outcomes. Both retailer and supplier managers
interviewed agree that if an influential lead supplier can
enhance its own category performance, it is highly moti-
vated to ensure similar gains for the retailer, because that is
what will enable that supplier to maintain its position of
CM influence. This suggests the following:
H8: The lead supplier’s category performance outcomes are
positively associated with the retailer’s category perfor-
mance outcomes.
Research Method
No secondary data are available for the key constructs rele-
vant to testing our model (Figure 1). In addition, retail CM
often differs among product categories, even within the same
retail chain (Dhar, Hoch, and Kumar 2001), so any research
in this arena must consider a wide range of categories. There-
fore, we adopted a two-tier survey data collection research
design to collect data from a large number of supermarket
chains on 35 product categories identified as representative
of those sold by supermarket retailers. These categories
appear in Table 1, ranked in descending order according to
composite estimates of U.S. national sales volume.
Survey Population and Responses
The Progressive Grocer (2004) Marketing Guidebook lists
all 590 U.S. supermarket buying offices (which house and
support buyers and category managers). Many supermar-
kets have policies against releasing information about sup-
pliers and participating in research. Therefore, we faxed a
personalized letter to the president or chief executive officer
of each buying office explaining the research, requesting
participation, and offering a report with benchmark results
in return. To make providing data more manageable, we
asked each buying office to provide data on only five prod-
uct categories by randomly selecting one category from
each of the five (ordered) groupings in Table 1. Then, we
sent each buying office president a cover letter along with
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five questionnaires for those categories. We asked the presi-
dent to give the category-specific questionnaire to the
manager most familiar with the supermarket’s business and
suppliers in that category. Thus, each retailer received ques-
tionnaires for different categories that represented a range
of sales volumes, and each questionnaire was completed by
the most knowledgeable manager.
We received 359 completed questionnaires from 107
separate buying offices; we subsequently excluded 12 ques-
tionnaires because of missing data. The response rate repre-
sents 21% of the retailers in our population, providing
responses for an average of more than three categories per
retailer. We obtained data from retail chains that are collec-
tively responsible for approximately 60% of U.S. supermar-
ket sales and 46% of all U.S. grocery sales. We also
obtained good coverage of the 35 categories selected for
our sample. The average number of responses per category
was 10; some categories had up to 15 responses, and the
lowest number of responses was 7. The lead suppliers iden-
tified by respondents accounted, on average, for 47.4% of
the retailers’ category sales and had been supplying them
for an average of 18.5 years.
Tests for nonresponse bias included a comparison of
secondary data for buying offices that participated in our
research with those that did not, which indicated no signifi-
cant differences in dollar sales and number of stores oper-
ated. We also compared the mean scores for all constructs
between early and later respondents (those responding
before and after the median date of response) and found no
significant differences between the two groups.
One year after the initial survey, we contacted the presi-
dents of the participating buying offices again and asked for
objective financial growth performance data (percentage
change in sales, profit, and market share over the past 12
months) for each of the five categories. We received these
data for 256 of the 347 (74%) retailer product categories for
which we had survey data.
Measures
Many of the constructs in Figure 1 are new to this research
design, so for these we combined insights from our field-
work and the literature to develop questionnaire items and
then used standard statistical tools to evaluate them. To
enhance face validity, we refined the wording and content
of an initial set of questionnaire items and instructions
according to feedback from six industry managers. These
were then further refined on the basis of a pretest of 20
category managers/buyers randomly selected from our gen-
eral population. After responding to questions about other
lead supplier characteristics, we also asked the retailer’s
category manager to indicate if the lead supplier was con-
sidered the retailer’s “category captain” for the category.
Our lead supplier opportunism measure extends Brown,
Dev, and Lee’s (2000) scale using insights from our field-
work. Our measure of militancy by other suppliers is a
more active and negative framing of the acquiescence mea-
sure developed by Morgan and Hunt (1994). Our fieldwork
and the literature indicate that category objectives vary
among retailers (e.g., Gruen and Shah 2000) and even
TAblE 1




Group Ranka Product Category Importanceb
Group 1 1 Snacks/salty snacks 6.25
2 Disposable diapers 4.95
3 Pet care 5.05
4 Bakery products 6.00
5 Carbonated beverages 6.56
6 Cereals 5.67
7 Cookies and crackers 5.72
Group 2 8 Laundry detergents/bleach 4.91
9 Cough and cold remedies 4.67
10 Oral hygiene 4.07
11 Bottled water 4.20
12 Ice cream 5.19
13 Fresheners/deodorizers 2.81
14 Deodorant 3.19
Group 3 15 Household cleaners 2.94
16 Baby foods, formulas, 
and electrolytes 4.42
17 Coffee 5.62
18 Soap/bath needs 3.11
19 Hair care 4.29
20 Candy 4.40
21 Desserts, gelatins, and 
pudding mixes 2.98
Group 4 22 Film and cameras 5.58
23 Milk 5.77
24 Butter and margarine 3.68
25 Cheese 5.22
26 Pasta 4.63
27 Spices and seasonings 3.40
28 Yogurt 3.36
Group 5 29 Vitamins 3.10
30 Toilet tissue 5.17
31 Jams, jellies, and spreads 3.18
32 Soups 3.36
33 Sugar and sugar substitutes 2.81
34 Shortening and oil 2.69
35 Flour 2.11
aU.S. supermarket sales volume based on a composite of
ACNielsen and Information Resources Inc. data.
bAs rated by the retailers in our sample using a seven-point scale
(“least” to “most”).
between categories for the same retailer (e.g., Dhar, Hoch,
and Kumar 2001). In measuring retailer category perfor-
mance, we therefore asked respondents to rate category per-
formance relative to their objectives over the past year using
four seven-point semantic differential scales. As noted previ-
ously, 12 months later we also obtained data covering the sub-
sequent financial growth performance of 256 of the 347 cate-
gories for which we collected initial survey data. Table 2 lists
the constructs, respondent questions, scale items, and anchors.
Table 3 provides a correlation matrix for our constructs
Assessment of Measures
We used confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) to assess our
measures (e.g., Gerbing and Anderson 1988). Our measure-
ment model fit well with the data (2 = 1225.5, d.f. = 665, p <
.001; incremental fit index [IFI] = .957; Tucker–Lewis
index [TLI] = .949; comparative fit index [CFI] = .957; and
root mean square error of approximation [RMSEA] = .049).
The composite reliabilities for the scales ranged from .85 to
.96 (see Table 2), suggesting excellent reliability. The
strong loadings and significant t-values for each item on the
constructs they are intended to represent (Table 2) support
the convergent validity of our measures (e.g., Anderson and
Gerbing 1988). For each possible pair of constructs we
compared chi-square statistics in measurement models in
which the covariance between the two constructs was
allowed to vary and then fixed at one (e.g., Bagozzi, Yi, and
Phillips 1991). Changes in chi-square were far greater than
the critical value in each case, supporting discriminant
validity in each model. We also computed the average vari-
ance extracted (AVE) values of each construct. These
ranged from 58% to 85%, while the shared variances
between the constructs ranged from 0% to 46%, indicating
discriminant validity among our constructs (e.g., Fornell
and Larcker 1981). We evaluated the convergent validity of
our retailer category performance measure using the objec-
tive financial growth performance data on percentage
changes in sales, profit, and market share for each surveyed
product category. These measures were significantly corre-
lated (p < .001) with the meeting retailer category goals
performance scale with coefficients of .335, .527, and .539,
respectively.
Hypothesis Testing
We tested our hypotheses using structural equation model-
ing (SEM). We controlled for measurement error using full
SEMs in which we estimated the nine constructs and speci-
fied relationships between them (Figure 1) simultaneously.
We estimated two separate models. The first used the full
sample and the meeting retailer category goals performance
dependent measure, and the second used the subset of the
sample for which we had the follow-up objective financial
growth data, using the three growth indicators to estimate a
single latent dependent measure. For each model, we esti-
mated all the paths shown in Figure 1 and also included a
same-source factor to control for possible common method
bias (e.g., Netemeyer et al. 1997); when we excluded a
same-source factor , the substantive results for both models
remained essentially the same.
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To account for potential CM policy differences between
retailers, we also controlled for retailer-specific fixed
effects on the CM variables in our model. Specifically, we
regressed dummy variables for the retail chains onto the
indicants of the CM intensity and lead supplier influence
latent constructs and then subtracted the portion of the indi-
cants that was explained by the chain effects before com-
puting the constructs. The results are substantively the same
as when the retailer fixed effects are not included, but the
addition of this control step enhances confidence in our
results.
As Table 4 shows, the structural equation models—both
for retailer category financial growth and also for meeting
retailer category performance goals—fit the data well; the
IFI, CFI, and TLI statistics are all well above .9 and
RMSEAs are well below .08. The models explain 49% of
the variance in retailers’ meeting category goals perfor-
mance and 23% of the variance in retailers’ objective finan-
cial growth. We also compared our hypothesis-testing mod-
els with more complex models that introduced additional
paths not shown in Figure 1. These neither significantly
increased model fit nor enhanced understanding of retail
CM. Therefore, the SEMs based on the relationships in Fig-
ure 1 provide stable and parsimonious estimates of the mul-
tivariate relationships in our data. 
To provide additional insights, we supplement the SEM
results with an analysis of variance to evaluate differences
in means (for all the variables in our model of retail CM)
between CM situations in which the retailer is relying on a
category captain and those in which the lead supplier is not
a category captain. Although this analysis is descriptive
rather than a test of the underlying causal mechanisms, it is
a useful supplement to our SEM analysis in that it provides
additional insights into a central question in retail CM prac-
tice—that is, on the conditions in which retailers rely on a
category captain and on the results that category captains
produce.
Results and Discussion
Table 4 provides coefficients for all the paths in the model
we tested. To aid the interpretation of our findings, we con-
ducted follow-up interviews in which we discussed our
results with 24 managers (17 of whom participated in our
survey data collection). When appropriate, we include
insights from these follow-up interviews in our subsequent
discussion.
SEM Hypothesis Testing Results
H1a, which suggests a positive relationship between the
retailer’s relative CM resources and CM intensity, is not
supported in either the meeting category goals or the objec-
tive financial growth SEM model. However, the H1b rela-
tionship between the retailer’s relative CM resources and
lead supplier CM influence is strongly supported in both
models, with coefficients of –.609 and –.638 (p < .001),
respectively. Conversely, the H2a posited relationship
between retailer marketing capabilities and CM intensity is
supported in both models with coefficients of .180 and .178
(p < .001), respectively, while the hypothesized negative
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TAblE 2
Constructs and Measure Assessment
Constructs, Questions, and Items Composite Standardized
(All Measured on Seven-Point Scales) Reliability AVE loading
Retailer’s Relative Resources
Please indicate the extent to which your firm has more or less of each of the .95 84%
following when compared to the resources of the supplier who has the most 
influence on how you manage this category... (“much less” to “much more”)
•Knowledge of consumers who shop this category of products .92
•Financial resources available for this category of products .86
•Insight into consumer buying habits for this category of products .96
•Level of brand awareness with consumers who shop this category of products .92
Retailer Marketing Capabilities
This store or chain... (“strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”) .85 67%
•Has a reputation with suppliers as a very capable marketer .73
•Is a sophisticated marketing organization .84
•Possesses strong marketing capabilities .88
Category Strategic Importance
This particular category... (“strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”) .91 71%
•Offers a higher gross margin percentage .54
•Acts as a “traffic builder” for the store .94
•Generates much larger dollar sales than other categories .90
•Is key to our ability to compete effectively .93
CM Intensity
Please indicate the total amount of time and effort devoted to each of the .91 58%
following activities for the set of products in this category at your chain, 
taking into consideration the total work done by you, others in the company, 
and/or by one or more suppliers… (“none” to “a great deal”)
•Analyzing pricing .75
•Determining the impact of special displays .79
•Analyzing profitability of individual SKUs .88
•Evaluating private label products .53
•Implementing promotion or advertising plans .85
•Adjusting logistical arrangements .61
•Changing the assortment of SKUs .80
•Developing detailed category performance objectives .83
lead Supplier Influence
Considering this category of products, the supplier who has the most influence... .95 81%
(“strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”)
•Has significant responsibility for execution in this category .85
•Has a big impact on category goal setting .96
•Strongly influences the planning of marketing initiatives .96
•Significantly influences how other suppliers’ SKUs are marketed .83
•Has significant input into the analysis done for this category .88
lead Supplier Opportunism
Considering this category of products, the supplier who has the most influence... .90 69%
(“strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”)
•Alters facts to suit their needs .84
•Often acts to benefit itself at our expense .87
•Gives complete, even unfavorable, information (reverse scored) .73
•Lacks integrity when not closely monitored .88
Militancy by Other Suppliers
Please indicate whether there has been more or less of each of the following .96 85%
behaviors on the part of suppliers for this category other than the most 
influential supplier… (“much less” to “much more”)
•Sabotaging good ideas from another supplier .93
•Arguing with my decisions .84
•Obstructing programs that we initiate .96
•Interfering with what needs to be done to meet our objectives .95
lead Supplier Category Performance
Please indicate the extent to which each of the below has increased or decreased… .89 67%
(“big decrease” to “big increase” anchors with “about the same” midpoint)
•Most influential supplier’s total category shelf space .79
•Most influential supplier’s share of category business .90
•Ads, displays and features for most influential supplier’s products .81
•Most influential supplier’s profits from this category at your store .78
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TAblE 2
Continued
Constructs, Questions, and Items Composite Standardized
(All Measured on Seven-Point Scales) Reliability AVE loading
Retailer Category Performance
Please indicate your assessment of the category’s performance versus objectives .95 83%
during the past year (semantic differential)
•“Excellent” to “poor” .93
•“Well short of goal” to “far exceeded goal” .90
•“Outstanding” to “unsatisfactory” .94
•“Improving” to “getting worse” .88
TAblE 3
Construct Intercorrelations
Construct 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1. Retailer relative resources 1.0
2. Retailer marketing capabilities .258** 1.0
3. Category strategic importance –.152** .167** 1.0
4. CM intensity –.185** .214** .677** 1.0
5. Lead supplier influence –.607** –.073 .350** .425** 1.0
6. Lead supplier opportunism –.063 –.263** –.127* –.046 –.014 1.0
7. Militancy by other suppliers –.037 –.078 .016 –.152** –.128* .144** 1.0
8. Lead supplier category performance –.288** .059 .387** .393** .447** –.225** –.006 1.0
9. Meeting retailer category goals –.174** .200** .537** .604** .451** –.183** –.116* .482** 1.0
10. Objective category financial growth –.029 .102 .380** .436** .246** –.058 –.134* .343** .551**








Paths Modeled Category Goals Financial Growth
H1a Retailer’s relative resources Æ CM intensity .017 .119
H1b Retailer’s relative resources Æ Lead supplier influence –.609*** –.638***
H2a Retailer marketing capabilities Æ CM intensity .180*** .178***
H2b Retailer marketing capabilities Æ Lead supplier influence .056 .047
H3a Category strategic importance Æ CM intensity .545*** .572***
H3b Category strategic importance Æ Lead supplier influence .242*** .220***
H4 Lead supplier influence Æ CM intensity .342*** .425***
H5a CM intensity Æ Retailer category performance .485*** .338***
H5b CM intensity Æ Lead supplier category performance .153** .184**
H5c CM intensity Æ Lead supplier opportunism .016 .073
H5d CM intensity Æ Militancy by other suppliers –.221*** –.185*
H6a Lead supplier influence Æ Retailer category performance .139* –.045
H6b Lead supplier influence Æ Lead supplier category performance .396*** .401***
H6c Lead supplier influence Æ Militancy by other suppliers –.067 –.075
R1 Lead supplier influence Æ Lead supplier opportunism .019 .025
H7 Lead supplier opportunism Æ Lead supplier category performance –.143* –.071
R2 Lead supplier opportunism Æ Retailer category performance –.099* –.006
R3 Lead supplier opportunism Æ Militancy by other suppliers .259*** .241***
R4 Militancy by other suppliers Æ Retailer category performance –.026 –.122
H8 Lead supplier category performance Æ Retailer category performance .181*** .161*
Fit Indexes
Meeting Retailer Category Goals Model
2 = 1303.84, d.f. = 681, p < .001; IFI = .952; CFI = .952; RMSEA = .051
Objective Category Financial Growth Model




relationship with lead supplier CM influence in H2b is not
supported in either model. H3a and H3b, which link category
strategic importance with CM intensity and lead supplier
CM influence, are strongly supported, with coefficients of
.545 and .572 (p < .001) and .242 and .220 (p < .001),
respectively.
In terms of the relationship between the two compo-
nents of retail CM at the heart of our model, our results
strongly support H4, with path coefficients for the lead sup-
plier influence–retail CM intensity relationship of .342 and
.425 (both p < .001), respectively, in the meeting retailer
category goals and objective financial growth models. This
supports industry analysts’ recommendations that retailers’
CM resource deficits can be overcome through CM rela-
tionships with lead suppliers, and the GVA insight that
leveraging a lead supplier’s resources and capabilities into
increased retail CM intensity involves giving the supplier
influence over the retailer’s CM decisions and actions in
return.
From a retail CM benefits perspective, the path coeffi-
cients of .485 and .338 (both p < .001) strongly support H5a,
which links CM intensity with retailer performance in both
the meeting retailer category goals and objective financial
growth models. Both models also support H5b, which links
CM intensity with the lead supplier’s category performance,
with coefficients of .153 and .184 (both p < .01), respec-
tively. Moreover, coefficients of –.221 (p < .001) and –.185
(p < .05) support the negative effect of more intensive CM
on militant behaviors by other suppliers (H5d). However, we
find no support for H5c, which posits a negative link
between CM intensity and lead supplier opportunism. As
we discuss subsequently, this may be because the absolute
level of opportunism is low, and it appears to be less of a
problem than many retailers anticipate. We also find some
support for the H6a proposition that retailers can benefit
from lead supplier CM influence beyond the benefits that
accrue through greater CM intensity, with a coefficient of
.139 (p < .05) in the retailer category performance model.
However, the insignificant coefficient in the objective
financial growth model indicates that this benefit may apply
to objectives other than those related to financial growth.
Our results also indicate strong support for H6b, which links
lead supplier influence on retailers’ CM directly to the lead
supplier’s performance, with path coefficients of .396 and
.401 (both p < .001) in the two models.
From a downside risk and cost perspective, in contrast
to Morgan, Kaleka, and Gooner (2007), we find no evi-
dence in either SEM that a lead supplier’s influence on
retail CM is related to its opportunism (R1). This may be a
result of differences in the U.S. and U.K. contexts. For
example, the U.K. market is dominated by a small number
of powerful retailers that keep CM largely in-house and
view exercising their power to gain price leverage over sup-
pliers as the normal “rules of the game.” As a result, U.K.
suppliers may have a greater incentive to exploit any influ-
ence they have. Alternatively, the different results may be a
result of including CM intensity in our comprehensive CM
model, which provides lead suppliers with a greater perfor-
mance benefit from working with rather than against the
retailer’s interests. 
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Consistent with Morgan, Kaleka, and Gooner (2007),
our SEM results show that when opportunism emerges, it
can both damage the retailer’s category performance directly
(R2) and incite militant behaviors by other suppliers (R3).
However, also consistent with Morgan, Kaleka, and
Gooner, the absence of a significant, negative militancy–
retailer performance relationship (R4) in either of our mod-
els suggests that nonlead suppliers have limited “punitive
capacity.” We find no support for H6c, which links lead sup-
plier influence with increased militancy by other suppliers.
We find some support for the hypothesized negative rela-
tionship between lead supplier opportunism and lead sup-
plier performance (H7) with a significant negative coeffi-
cient of –.143 (p < .05) in the meeting retailer category
goals model. Finally, both SEM models support H8, which
links lead supplier category performance with retailer cate-
gory performance, with path coefficients of .181 (p < .001)
and .161 (p < .05), respectively.
Discussion of SEM Results
These results offer important new insights into the benefits
of retail CM. First, more intensive CM efforts bring perfor-
mance benefits to both the retailer and lead supplier. In
addition, with a significant, negative relationship with mili-
tancy by other suppliers, our study suggests that this can
occur in ways that may also be appreciated by the other
suppliers to a category. From a simple “more effort delivers
more results” perspective, these results may appear intuitive
for the retailer; however, they contrast with the widespread
skepticism regarding claims of CM benefits among retailers
in our fieldwork and in the trade press. In addition, the find-
ing that both retailers and suppliers (including those who
may have little or no influence on retail CM) claim these
CM value-creation benefits contradicts prior analytical
work suggesting that retailers will claim all of any CM
benefits (e.g., Basuroy, Mantrala, and Walters 2001;
Gajanan, Basuroy, and Beldona 2007). Second, our results
show that lead supplier influence on retailer CM also brings
positive benefits for both the lead supplier and the
retailer— beyond those that accrue to both parties through
driving greater CM intensity. In addition, the evidence we
present of some direct benefits of lead supplier influence to
retailer category performance suggests that even when
retailers have and deploy needed CM resources to inten-
sively manage a category, the quality of CM may be
enhanced by involving lead suppliers. 
Our SEM results also offer important new insights con-
cerning when greater retail CM intensity is most likely.
First, consistent with GVA, we find that when retailers’ in-
house CM resources are inferior, they seek help from a lead
supplier by ceding influence over their CM decisions. How-
ever, when retailers possess superior CM resources, we find
that they are not using them to engage in more intensive
CM. Given the CM performance benefits we show, this is a
missed opportunity for some of the retailers in our sample.
Conversely, we find that while retailers with greater mar-
keting capabilities engage in more intensive CM, the
absence of these capabilities does not appear to motivate
retailers to seek CM support from an influential lead sup-
plier. Thus, while more capable retailers are engaging in
more intensive CM, many retailers with their own CM
resources apparently allow their fears of relying on a lead
supplier to blind them to an important opportunity to
enhance their CM efforts and forgo CM’s benefits as a
result.
Second, we find that more retail CM occurs in cate-
gories that are strategically important to the retailer. At one
level, this is intuitive: Retailers should allocate scarce CM
resources wherever they can most contribute to achieving
their strategic objectives. Likewise, lead suppliers that want
to maximize their retail CM influence will allocate their
own resources to the retailer categories that will give them
the greatest influence. However, both core competence
(e.g., Hamel and Prahalad 1994) and positioning (e.g.,
Porter 1996) strategic logic suggest that retailers should
keep direct control over activities that are central to their
long-term competitive advantage. In addition, GVA sup-
ports these arguments but, importantly, also posits that
firms can allow external control of strategically important
activities if the value creation and claiming benefits of
doing so can be protected by an appropriate governance
mechanism (e.g., Ghosh and John 1999, 2005). That the
retailers in our sample generally allow a lead supplier more
CM influence in the retailer’s most strategically important
categories in exchange for access to the resources necessary
to create value through CM indicates that, despite the skep-
ticism and fears voiced in the literature and our fieldwork,
retailers believe that CM is such a governance mechanism.
Finally, from a downside risk and costs perspective, our
SEM results clearly show that retailer fears regarding retail
CM are overblown. Opportunism by lead suppliers does
exist in our sample, and when it does, it damages the
retailer’s and lead supplier’s performance. However, we
show that opportunism is no more likely to occur in cate-
gories under retail CM. Moreover, we also show that retail
CM is likely to reduce rather than incite militant behaviors
by other suppliers. Collectively, these results indicate that
retail CM is an effective value-creating and claiming mech-
anism in which retailer–lead supplier CM relationships can
be win-win—and that this can be accomplished without
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sacrificing the retailer’s relationships with its other suppli-
ers. However, if judged by their CM actions, it is apparent
that to some of the retailers in our sample, these conclu-
sions are either not obvious or not believed. To provide
greater insight into this, we now turn to a follow-up
descriptive analysis.
Profile of Category Captain Conditions and
Outcomes
Table 5 presents means and standard deviations for all of
the variables in our Figure 1 model of retail CM for the
total sample as well as for situations in which the retailer
has elected to use a category captain and those in which the
lead supplier is not a category captain. Note that in our sam-
ple, which is representative of a large number of categories
and supermarket chains, half the retail CM situations we
examine involve reliance on a category captain. Next, we
briefly profile the characteristics of these retail CM situa-
tions in which a category captain is used.
Table 5 confirms that category captains enjoy dramati-
cally higher (5.47 vs. 2.66) mean CM influence than suppli-
ers in traditional roles, and on average the categories they
support are managed much more intensively (means of 4.77
vs. 4.03). This indicates that the category captain measure
converges with our retail CM conceptualization and its key
measures.
On average, retail CM settings managed by category
captains are more strategically important to retailers (4.74
vs. 4.10) than those managed without a captain, and retail-
ers acknowledge that these are categories in which they on
average have lower relative resources (2.79 vs. 4.63) and
marketing capabilities (4.87 vs. 5.14). Retailers report that
the mean level of opportunism is relatively low for both
category captains and other lead suppliers—and impor-
tantly, the difference (2.45 vs. 2.54) does not approach sta-
tistical significance (p < .517). Despite the similar mean
levels of opportunism by category captains and other lead
suppliers, retailers report that militancy by other suppliers is
on average significantly lower with category captains (3.33
vs. 3.88). However, an even greater benefit highlighted in
this analysis is that category captains are associated with
TAblE 5
Descriptive and ANOVA Statistics for Total Sample and Subgroups of those Retailers Using or 
Not Using a Category Captain
Total Sample Category Captain No Category
(n = 347) (n = 174) Captain (n = 173) F (p-Value)
Construct M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) d.f. = 1,346
Lead supplier influence 4.07 (1.82) 5.47 (1.04) 2.66 (1.26) 513.84 (p < .001)
CM intensity 4.40 (1.21) 4.77 (.96) 4.03 (1.32) 35.78 (p < .001)
Retailer relative resources 3.71 (1.85) 2.79 (1.61) 4.63 (1.61) 113.68 (p < .001)
Retailer marketing capabilities 5.20 (.99) 4.87 (.99) 5.14 (1.13) 5.65 (p < .018)
Category strategic importance 4.42 (1.55) 4.74 (1.36) 4.10 (1.67) 15.41 (p < .001)
Lead supplier opportunism 2.50 (1.30) 2.45 (1.17) 2.54 (1.42) .421 (p < .517)
Militancy by other suppliers 3.60 (1.34) 3.33 (1.38) 3.88 (1.24) 14.94 (p < .001)
Lead supplier category performance 4.63 (.75) 4.86 (.66) 4.40 (.76) 37.13 (p < .001)
Meeting retailer category goals 4.60 (1.30) 5.05 (.92) 4.15 (1.47) 47.13 (p < .001)
Objective financial growth 1.47 (2.67) 1.97 (2.95) 1.02 (2.31) 7.41 (p < .007)
much higher average performance for the retailer in meet-
ing its category objectives (5.05 vs. 4.15) and achieving
financial growth (1.97 vs. 1.02). Category captains clearly
do not produce this result by trading off their own well-
being for the benefit of the retailer. To the contrary, cate-
gory captain mean performance gains are on average higher
(4.86 vs. 4.40) while achieving higher performance for their
retail partners. These descriptive results are consistent with
the estimates produced by the SEM analysis, but the magni-
tude of the advantage of using a category captain is even
clearer, suggesting that no retailer or supplier should ignore
the potential value of such collaborations.
These results offer new insights into the use of category
captains. The incidence of category captain relationships we
observe is more common than is widely believed among
industry analysts. (Both retailers and suppliers have been
reticent to provide estimates of the extent of the use of cate-
gory captains.) When retailers enter into such category cap-
tain relationships with a lead supplier, our findings suggest
that the beneficial effects of retail CM for both retailers and
suppliers may be even greater than those revealed in our
SEM results. Category captain situations exhibit signifi-
cantly higher levels of both CM intensity and lead supplier
influence on retail CM and significantly higher mean cate-
gory performance outcomes for both retailers and lead sup-
pliers. In addition, the downside risks and costs of CM may
be even lower when the lead supplier to the category is a
category captain—with similarly low levels of opportunism
and significantly lower levels of militant behaviors by other
suppliers when using category captains. Overall, this sug-
gests that retailers’ outsourcing of CM to category captain
lead suppliers offers a viable way to enhance channel sys-
tem efficiency. However, as we observe here, only half our
sample of retail CM situations is retailers benefiting from
such arrangements.
Implications for Theory
Our study offers contributions to theory in three main areas.
First, we develop and test a comprehensive new model of
retail CM. Our model reveals the importance of the inten-
sity of CM efforts in a category in understanding retail CM.
Most prior work has adopted an analytical perspective and
viewed CM as a binary variable (i.e., does the retailer “do”
CM or not? e.g., Gajanan, Basuroy, and Beldona 2007). We
show that this framing is unrealistic and may therefore
potentially produce misleading insights. Both our fieldwork
and empirical results indicate that retailers’ CM resources
are scarce. Retailers must therefore make strategic resource
allocations regarding how intensively to manage each of the
categories that they sell. Therefore, it is unlikely—if not
impossible—for any retailer selling 300-plus product cate-
gories to simply make and execute a policy decision to
manage all its categories intensively. We also observe a
wide range of different CM intensity values across the 347
CM situations for which we have data—with less than 10%
of these categories being managed at either extremely low
or extremely high intensity (2 or less or 6 or more on a
seven-point scale). Thus, we show that CM intensity is
rarely an “all or nothing” decision at either the retailer or
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the category level. This suggests the need for finer-grained
analytical CM models that allow for different levels of CM
intensity rather than simply the existence (or nonexistence)
of retail CM.
In addition, the research streams considering CM and
buyer–seller relationships have developed independently of
one another. Our model offers the first integration of these
research streams, considering both the level of CM activi-
ties (CM intensity) and who performs them (lead supplier
influence). We show that both aspects of retail CM need to
be examined simultaneously, because studying either com-
ponent in isolation presents an incomplete picture of retail
CM and produces potentially erroneous conclusions. For
example, our SEM results indicate that focusing on either
lead supplier influence or CM intensity would significantly
understate the benefits of retail CM to both retailers and
lead suppliers. Similarly, ignoring lead supplier influence’s
effect on retail CM would miss its critical role in driving
CM intensity in our results, while focusing only on lead
supplier influence would miss other suppliers’ reduction in
militancy associated with more intensive CM efforts. Thus,
we show that any comprehensive model capable of explain-
ing when retail CM occurs and its costs and benefits must
include both of these components. Our data—representing a
wide variety of product categories sold by U.S. supermarket
retailers— provide strong support for our model. Our
empirical results are specific to the U.S. supermarket chan-
nel, but our theorizing has wider applications to other mar-
kets in which retailers and wholesalers sell multiple brands
from multiple suppliers.
Second, we offer new insights into the mechanisms by
which retail CM adds value in a network supply-chain con-
text. For example, we find that relying on a lead supplier in
retail CM leads to improved performance for the retailer
and the lead supplier, without provoking greater levels of
push-back from other suppliers. Furthermore, the greater
CM intensity produced by relying on lead suppliers actually
reduces other suppliers’ militancy. These outcomes may be
even stronger when the lead supplier is a designated cate-
gory captain. Overall, this supports the idea that dyadic
buyer– supplier relationships can affect the rest of the sup-
ply network (e.g., Anderson, Håkansson, and Johanson
1994). Indeed, in retail CM and other analogous settings
(e.g., vendor-managed inventory, outsourcing of R&D to
“first-tier” parts suppliers), the dyadic buyer–lead supplier
relationship is designed to create such network effects.
However, in the face of supply network interdependencies,
such buyer–seller relationships can clearly give rise to costs
as well as benefits. In our U.S. supermarket context, we do
not observe significant lead supplier opportunism and other
supplier militancy risks and costs. However, in other situa-
tions in which nonlead suppliers are less dependent on a
small number of large buyers and/or have a higher punitive
capacity, such network costs might outweigh CM’s benefits.
Third, we provide new insights relevant to the emerging
GVA perspective on interorganizational relationships and
marketing strategy that incorporates firm-specific resource
differences (e.g. Ghosh and John 1999, 2005; Palmatier,
Dant, and Grewal 2007). Importantly, despite the potential
for conflicting goals and power-dependency issues, our
results show that sharing of needed resources can be
accomplished in ways that result in true win-win relation-
ships between buyers and suppliers—even in a context that
our fieldwork revealed uses no formal contracts to safe-
guard the ability to claim value from their joint efforts.
Thus, consistent with GVA, appropriately designed and
managed buyer–seller coordination is clearly a viable rela-
tional mechanism to expand resource availability, enable
new value-creating strategies to be conceived and executed,
and allow the outcomes to be jointly claimed by both par-
ties. This has important implications. For example, it sug-
gests that channel research using analytical models should
allow for win-win relationships such as those we observe,
rather than focusing only on zero-sum games (e.g., Basuroy,
Mantrala, and Walters 2001; Gajanan, Basuroy, and Bel-
dona 2007).
Implications for Managers and Policy Makers
Our study offers several important new insights for man-
agers. First, in the absence of credible evidence of CM
benefits, many retailers have undermanaged the product
categories they sell. We show that retailers engage with lead
suppliers when facing deficits in needed CM resources and
ramp up their CM intensity and category performance as a
result. However, we also show that when retailers possess
the needed CM resources in-house, they are not using these
resources to increase the intensity of their CM efforts. This
is short-sighted. Contrary to the skepticism uncovered in
our fieldwork, we show that more intensive retail CM has
performance benefits for both retailers and suppliers. The
fact that we find these benefits in a sample of 35 categories,
across a large proportion of the U.S. supermarket popula-
tion, enhances confidence in the generalizability of this
relationship. It also suggests that retailers can benefit from
CM across a wider range of the product categories they sell
than has been previously believed. Thus, retailers should
prioritize both the development and deployment of
resources needed for effective CM. In doing so, our results
suggest that the development of in-house retailer marketing
capabilities should clearly be a priority.
Second, our results indicate that retailers should
actively seek to use effective suppliers to serve as category
captains to more intensively manage the product categories
they sell and to improve category performance. We show
that retailers and influential lead suppliers can collaborate
in retail CM in a win-win manner and that retailer fears
concerning the downside risks and costs associated with
allowing a supplier to have significant CM influence are
overblown. The CM benefits we uncover for lead suppliers
also suggest that producers should be open to overtures
from retailers and should also initiate category captain rela-
tionships. A supplier that can document success in CM rela-
tionships with other retailers, especially in noncompeting
markets, will likely have an advantage in this effort.
Third, although we find that an influential lead supplier is
no more likely to be opportunistic and that average levels of
opportunism are low, some opportunism does still exist. Our
results show that this opportunism damages the lead sup-
plier’s as well as the retailer’s performance and also provokes
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other suppliers’ militant behaviors. Thus, retailers should
continue to be vigilant in their monitoring—particularly
when they do not use a category captain—and should
encourage all suppliers to report such opportunism when
they see it. Supplier managers should also note that retailers
are readily able to detect and punish opportunism and that
the performance benefits of being influential in retailers’
CM in the U.S. supermarket supply chain offer rewards that
make any short-term benefits of opportunism look even less
attractive.
Finally, our findings on retailers’ use of category cap-
tains in retail CM are also of interest to public policy mak-
ers. Antitrust analysts have discussed the potential for a
category captain to either unfairly disadvantage competing
suppliers to a product category or to collude with them
(e.g., Desrochers, Gundlach, and Foer 2003; Steiner 2001).
Category captains are the norm in some CM situations, and
they directly affect the marketing of rivals’ products. They
are potentially able to restrict competition and thereby dam-
age consumer welfare. Our findings of decreased militancy
by other suppliers when retailers use designated category
captains suggest that some force—competition limiting
power, collusion, or a combination—is at work. However,
the increased efficiency and effectiveness in meeting con-
sumer needs suggested by improvements in retailer and
category captain category performance—apparently not at
the expense of other suppliers—may be an equally impor-
tant consideration from a social welfare perspective.
Limitations and Research Directions
There are several limitations in our study. First, much of the
data was collected at the same time, thus limiting our ability
to evaluate causality. However, we based the ordering of
relationships tested on insights generated in our fieldwork,
and it is supported in the literature. Moreover, by collecting
financial growth data a year later for a large subset of our
sample, we were able to confirm the retail CM–performance
relationships. Nonetheless, further research utilizing longi-
tudinal research designs may be useful in confirming the
causal ordering of the other relationships uncovered in our
research. For example, time-series analysis of category-
level scanner data before and after the introduction of a CM
system could evaluate the performance effects on the
retailer, lead supplier, and other suppliers. Second, although
we sampled 35 representative product categories, other
categories that are defined by different retailers in more
idiosyncratic ways may be handled differently. Thus, care
should be applied in generalizing our results to other cate-
gories. In addition, in the interest of generalizing our find-
ings across a broad range of categories, this research uses a
cross-category and cross-retailer design. Further research
examining individual categories and retailers may provide a
richer understanding of the contingencies associated with
category performance. 
Our findings suggest several additional areas for further
research. First, in this initial research, we focus on linking
the deployment of resources in retail CM with performance
outcomes for retailers and suppliers. However, we do not
explicitly distinguish which party’s resources are actually
being deployed in the retailer’s CM. Does it matter whether
it is primarily the retailer’s, the lead supplier’s, or other sup-
pliers’ resources—and if more than one of these, in what
combination? This is a promising line of inquiry for theo-
retically interesting and managerially relevant CM research. 
Second, although we adopt a retailer perspective, our
findings of lead supplier benefits suggest that a key question
for further research is the cost to a supplier of supporting—
or even taking over—retailers’ CM. In addition, our inter-
views suggest that suppliers increasingly view jockeying
for the category captain position as the basis of intersup-
plier competition. This raises important new questions. For
example, what resources and strategies are required to com-
pete effectively to be a category captain? Furthermore,
given supplier consolidation and the network nature of the
supply chain, what is the impact of multicategory and multi-
retailer competition on supplier strategies and performance?
For example, category captains and other suppliers may
consciously or unconsciously share in the value created in
retail CM. Is this a result of tacit agreements with other sup-
pliers not to exclude them from CM benefits because of
multipoint contacts in which rival CPG suppliers act as
category captain for the same category for different retailers
and/or as category captain on different categories for the
same retailer?
Finally, given the public policy concerns surrounding
the impact of retail CM on competition and consumer wel-
fare, retailer–supplier CM relationships are clearly an area
in which further research is required. For example,
researchers should examine the impact of using category
captains on the wholesale prices of both the lead and other
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suppliers’ brands—and the subsequent retail prices charged
to consumers. In addition, as highlighted previously, there
is multipoint contact among suppliers in this channel and
likely lead/nonlead supplier role reversals when most CPG
firms sell across multiple categories and all sell to multiple
retailers. It is therefore important to examine whether and
how such multipoint contact among suppliers may reduce
channel competition and efficiency and how it affects
wholesale prices.
Conclusion
Despite skepticism among managers, we show that positive
performance outcomes can be realized by both a retailer
and a category captain when a retailer’s product categories
are more intensively managed and a category captain has
significant influence over the management of all the brands
in the category. We also show that many of the feared
downside costs and risks associated with retail CM are
overblown and are outweighed by the benefits for retailers
and suppliers that serve as category captain. Our study pro-
vides the first evidence that retail CM is an effective value-
creating and value-claiming mechanism in which retailer–
supplier relationships can be win-win. However, even when
they have the needed resources in-house, we find that many
retailers are undermanaging the product categories they
sell. Apparently, they do not want to cede control to an
influential lead supplier but then do not take steps to
increase CM intensity and category performance unilater-
ally. We show that this is shortsighted and leads to subopti-
mal performance.
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